Port Access Development

INTRODUCTION 
On the 15th of May, 2017, the Nigerian Premium Times reported that the Nigerian Ports Authority in collaboration with Dangote and Flour Mills has decided to raise precisely 4.3 Billion Naira towards the reconstruction of the port access roads within the Apapa axis. 

The present development of the railway system in Nigeria by the present Minister of Transport which in turn will serve as a revival plan for the previously inactive Nigeria  Railway Cooperation is another recent development that will lay out a successive path to a well-structured port facility in Nigeria.

However, despite these developments, Nigeria has not met up with their requirements, obligations and responsibilities as a coastal state. Neither have they taken proper advantage of the economic leverage available to coastal states that provide transit services to neighbouring states that don't have coastal seas or access to their own territorial waters. This writeup defines what a Land Locked State(LLS) is, what a Port State/Coastal State is and where Nigeria seems to be missing the point in the developmental incentives involved in the course of developing an efficient port access infrastructure.

PORT/LANDLOCKED STATES
A port is a location on a coast or shore containing one or more harbors where ships can dock and transfer people or cargo to or from land. Port locations are selected to optimize access to land and navigable water, for commercial demand, and for shelter from wind and waves. Another major advantage brought to a port with efficient port access is the international strength and political power gained by offering support to neighbouring landlocked states who do not have access to the seas but have to rely on the services rendered by the port state in order to receive goods in large quantities and to foster international trade ties with other countries in the world. This is a powerful monopoly strategy that cannot be delegated but it all depends on how well the port state utilises this advantage. 

There are 16 Landlocked States/countries in Africa generally characterized by their lack of a sea coast namely: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Among these, Chad, Niger, Zambia and Zimbabwe are over 2, 000 km from the nearest sea coast. While the european counterparts like Switzerland  which has direct access from Basel to the North Sea via the Rhine, African landlocked states are disadvantaged by lack of navigable waters and poor infrastructure.

The problem of LLS is a matter of national survival. Developing LLS need access to the sea through transit states for their transport and trade, as a crucial matter of national importance. Part X of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes the right of free access to and from the sea for landlocked States. The convention is regarded as the UN's biggest contribution to the cause of LLS. Significantly, reciprocity is no longer required as a condition of transit. The rights of LLS to the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal states of the same region or sub-region is provided for in Article 69.

It has become very detrimental to the integrity and outright standing of Nigeria as a coastal state to not only provide for efficient port access infrastructure within the country but also to extend these services  to the neighbouring states up north as Nigeria is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and is therefore bound by international law to provide services as a coastal and a transit port. 

This could also serve as a huge revenue generating strategy for the Nigerian economy especially at a time when the market structure is literally struggling to survive. From the UNCLOS, we can tell that the rights provided under Article 125 (1) seems not an absolute right and it should be considered along with sub article 2 and 3 of the same article. Article 125 (3) states that ‘transit States, in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their territory, shall have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities provided for in this Part for land-locked States shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests'.

For example, for being placed in an appropriate geographical condition, the Islamic Republic of Iran benefits from transit advantages.  With expansion of a reliable and efficient transportation network, the benefits has been optimally evidenced to have elevated the exchange revenues and has promoted the strategic condition of Iran in the region. 

THE NIGERIAN SITUATION

The Nigerian government is in dire need of diversification in investments, trade and international treaties which will be taken seriously and not just ratified, assented to and dumped aside. Imagine the emancipation of wealth waiting to occur if only infrastructure alone were to be brought to par with their standards of operation. 

There are government agencies in this country lying in waste and waiting on developments of infrastructure in order to reach their apex in the delivery of services. The Nigerian Shippers Council for instances was solely created to attend to the affairs of shippers all over the country. In order to achieve this, there are branch offices of the Shippers Council situate at the 6 geo-political zones of the country yet their activities have died down because the inland container depots are in dilapidated and non existent conditions. 

The inland container depots are supposed to be "inland ports" where Nigerians who are to receive shipments by sea can go and receive their goods from the geopolitical zone closest to them and not have to go all the way to the ports in Lagos, Calabar or Warri ports and the likes. If this system were applicable, Lagos wouldn't be so congested and the inland container depots would comfortably provide job opportunities and rapid developments where they are situated. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Nigerian government through the federal ministry of Transport should invest largely in rebuilding the infrastructure of the ports facilities, the roads and railway lines. There should be a railway line each that connects all six geopolitical zones in the country.

2. The federal ministry of transport should move to create and MAINTAIN a National Liner, a National trucking system (or a public-private partnership in this field) and an inland container depot in all the six geopolitical zones in the country.  

3.  There should be an investment put in place to provide for cargo moving trains which will be different from the passenger moving trains; all divided into oil cargo, grain cargo and other types of cargo respectively. 

4. The Nigerian government should revisit the UNCLOS ratification and draft a legal framework outlining the responsibilities expected of them by virtue of the legal standing of the convention. 

5. A TOTAL redraft of the Nigeria Shippers Council Act (1973) is highly needed ASAP which will serve the need of shippers all over the country and focus on creating proactive measures that will remain relevant and applicable in years to come. 

Underutilized Investment Opportunities in the Nigerian Maritime Industry

With the present state of the economy in the country due to the fall in oil price and the crisis/fluctuations in the value of the naira, not a lot of people will buy the idea of investments in whatever fields suggested. Not up to 50% of the people living in this country can afford three square meals or even a good standard of living day in and day out; talk more of considering the option of sinking finances and efforts into trying to run a business when survival on its own is a struggle.

However, every country from time to time needs international capital and private investment in order to supplement domestic savings. Investment helps countries reach their economic potential by providing capital to finance new industries and enhance existing industries, boosting infrastructure, productivity, and employment opportunities in the process.

The higher growth supported by investments pays dividends for all increasing tax revenues to the Federal government and State governments, thereby increasing the funds available to spend on schools, roads and other social amenities. By bringing in new businesses with connections in different markets, it encourages competition and increased innovation by bring in new technologies and services to the market.

There are quite a number of small scale and large scale businesses in the maritime industry which have yet to be properly cultivated and developed. In my opinion, this is due to the fact that not a lot of people are in the know of the workings of the maritime industry and its importance in our country. The most practical ones are outlined below in regards to the issues and affairs presently faced in maritime:

INVESTING IN WRECK REMOVAL
In the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1894, "wreck" is defined as including "... jetsam, flotsam, lagan, and derelict in or on the shores of the sea or any tidal waters". Going deeper, 'jetsam' refers to goods thrown into the sea to lighten the vessel. 'Flotsam' refers to goods which float when a ship sinks. 'Lagan' on the other hand refers to goods from sunken ships heavier than water which has been buoyed to prevent it from sinking. 'Derelicts' refer to the ship itself if it is not in the possession or control of its owner.

Apart from the problem of marine pollution, which is presently a serious problem the Federal government needs to counter, it is important that the territorial waters are liberated from harmful objects and debris especially now that the government has intentions of investing in a National Liner.

A project as responsive as building ships and reviving Ship Liners in Nigeria (which is the latest concern of the Federal Ministry of Transport hence the recent Nigeria Ship Finance Conference held on the 31st of October) places on all concerned, the duty of making sure that it is executed accordingly.  This will require first and foremost a non-hazardous marine environment in order to launch the sea going vessels.

To be honest, wreck removal could be expensive depending on the nature of the wreckage. If the wreckage is afloat then it could be easy for tug boats employed for sanitization to pick them up and take them ashore. However, if the wreckage is sunken, heavy or is seen to be an outright threat to navigation, it could sometimes involve cutting the hull into easily handled sections or refloating the vessel and scuttling it in deeper waters.

After the Exxon Valdez tragedy in 1989 which stands as the most expensive wreck removal operation in all of history, the recent ship wreck of MSC Napoli stands as the second most expensive at a cost of 120 Million Pounds. However, if investments are channeled towards this area in maritime, it is sure to establish a system of wreck removal guaranteed to develop over the years. As opposed to our reactive way of dealing with issues, maybe for the first time in a while, we would develop proactive measures on how to handle and maintain a sanitized marine environment free of wreckage.

On the international plane, Nigeria was the eighth country to ratify the Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks (Nairobi Convention) which entered into force on the 14th day of April, 2015. The Convention is not yet in force in Nigeria and it must be domesticated to fit into the judicial system and the body of laws in Nigeria.

However, the Nairobi Conventional does provide the fundamentals which could constitute an action or place a responsibility on the Coastal State to act. The following represents a logical series of issues which a government and those representing an owner's interests would need to consider:

• Is the reported wreck located within the area covered by the Convention? Article 1 of the Convention defines what it calls the "the Convention area" as being the exclusive economic zone or an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea but not extending more than 200 nautical miles from the coast excluding territorial waters. 
• Is the sunken or stranded ship a 'wreck' within the meaning of the convention? The resulting definition of endless debates at Legal Committees concerned with wreckage includes sunken or stranded ships or any parts thereof as well as things washed off ships including cargo.
• Is there an obligation to report that a maritime casualty has occurred and that the vessel has become a wreck? Article 5 of the Convention places an obligation on the master and operator of a ship to report when a maritime casualty has occurred and that the vessel has become a wreck as a consequence. 
• Does the wreck represent a hazard to the coast? If a wreck is determined to be a hazard, then various rights and obligations arise. If not then the Convention does not apply. Article 1(5) of the convention defines a hazard as any condition or threat that poses a danger or impediment to navigation or may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences to the marine environment, or damage to the coastline or related interests of one or more States.

• If the wreck does indeed represent a hazard, then what rights and obligations arise? In this case, the Affected State has an obligation to ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to mark the wreck in conformity with the internationally accepted systems of buoyage. There is a further obligation on the Affected State to to publish, for the benefit of all mariners, particulars of the marking of the wreck (Article 8).

CONCLUSION
The costs of being held liable for an action or responsibility can run down and affect the economy of a State negatively if not properly handled. More than ever, now is the time to invest in wreck removal services when it is still in its developmental stage. The Nigerian Ports Authority is responsible for all wrecks blocking the access channels of navigation while the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) is responsible for the wrecks outside the access channels.

The sooner the government is able to set up an efficient wreck removal system or better still, let the services out to private individuals and investors so as to open doors for job opportunities and provide excellent services to ship goers, the better the growth in the industry. The Federal Government NEEDS to domesticate the Nairobi Convention because a system without a stable legal frame work will not hold. Appropriate policies can encourage participatory, demand driven and sustainable development. The Merchant Shipping Act (2007) has made provisions here and there that addresses certain issues pertaining to wreck removal but a concise legal framework centrally dedicated to this field will go a long way in establishing a well rooted system of wreckage removal.

So Where Did The Pirates Come From?

Piracy has been a persistent problem for thousands of years, in fact from the time ships started to sail the oceans. The phenomenon was not limited to a particular region and contemporary universal condemnation of piracy might suggest that it was always viewed with disdain. However, pirates were repeatedly tolerated and sometimes even viewed by states as a certain foreign policy tool to be employed for their own interests.
In addition to "pirates" who attacked any ships indifferent of the flag of State it was flying, or committed robbery or other acts of violence at sea against any persons or ships for private ends whether in time of war or peace, there were "privateers", "buccaneers", "filibusters", "corsairs", "freebooters", all having their own definitions. There is no room in this contribution to elaborate extensively on all the definitions but some of the main features of "privateering" will be noted as it is the most wide spread and encompassing phenomenon.
A 'privateer' was a person under a contract to a government, usually in the form of a 'letter of marque' (sometimes having the full title 'a letter of marque and reprisal') issued by a recognized State authorizing him to attack and capture vessels having nationality of a State which the former State was at war with. The contract most often also provided that the government received a share of the profits. The most obvious difference between the pirates and the privateers was that in the event of capture, the latter were subject to the rules and laws of war and were to be treated the same as prisoners of war. Privateers were hence supposed to follow rules of naval warfare, including limiting their activities to times of declared war, precluding attacks on the vessels of cargoes of neutral States and their nationals, and submitting to procedures of prize law.
Privateering became an accepted part of the law of naval warfare authorized at times by all significant naval powers. however, there were many instances when a particular person was crossing the line and moving from being a pirate to a privateer and vice versa. Because of this confusing system, there were differences in treatment of sea outlaws. this fluctuated almost till the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (the Paris Declaration) abolishing privateering was signed in 1856 by most of the European imperial powers.
Spain and the United States stayed away from the Paris Declaration and interestingly, the Constitution of the United States still contains provisions which gives to the Congress power to grant letters of marque and reprisal.
It was until the 20th century that the attempts to establish common definition of piracy (different from privateering) became more persistent. in the 1920's, the Assembly of the League of Nations requested the Council of the League of Nations to prepare a provisional list of subjects of international law which would seem to be the most desirable and realizable. The committee responsible for drawing up this list included piracy and also enclosed Draft Provision for the Suppression of Piracy, but the subject was later dropped by the Council, reportedly on grounds that piracy was no longer a pressing issue to the international community and that the achievement of a universal agreement seemed somewhat difficult.
Nevertheless, in the 1930's, the so-called Harvard Research Group had already drafted a Convention on Piracy, commonly known as the 'Harvard Draft'. The International Law Commission during its preparatory work on the theme of the Law of the Sea drew substantially from the Harvard Draft provisions as the basis for the piracy articles of what later became the Convention on the High Seas (1958).
That definition of piracy in Article 15 of the HSC together with the relevant provisions on piracy in Articles 14 and 16-21 were mostly incorporated into the United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the primary multilateral instrument in the field of international law. Therefore, the UNCLOS definition of piracy comprises four main elements:

1. illegal act of violence, detention or depredation
2. private ends
3. involvement of two ships (the possibility of involvement of aircraft falls beyond the scope of the present contribution, although theoretically it cannot be instantly denied that an act of piracy could involve not only two aircraft but also aircraft and a ship); and
4. location at the high seas.

What EVERY Nigerian Should Know About Their Country's Sovereignty

Almost every Nigerian, including your kids/ nieces and nephews in school know fully well that the capital of their country is Abuja, We are located in West Africa and there are three major languages spoken. Going deeper, its common knowledge that Nigeria is a vary large country and geographically takes up to 923, 768 square kilometers worth of Land Mass. However, that's not all that there is as regards our rights to geographical territory.

Nigeria, like every other coastal State is entitled to its territorial sea which has an existence in its own right. The "territorial sea" / "maritime belt" / or "marginal sea" was first regulated by conventional law  through the territorial sea convention which consists of 32 articles and is the forerunner of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) UNCLOS. The UNCLOS has strictly adhered to the provisions of the Territorial sea Convention which in turn kept to International Customary law.

On the other hand, after gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria on its own enacted a territorial sea legislation in 1967 which was amended twice in 1971 and 1998 respectively. However, Nigeria became a party to the 1982 UNCLOS on the 14th of August, 1986 thereby making its legislative mark concerning the territorial waters both at the indigenous level and internationally.

ORIGIN AND HISTORY
The notion of a territorial sea has its origin in the need to protect a coastal State from attacks and to provide a coastal buffet zone. Article 2, paragraph 1 of the UNCLOS states that "the sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea".
Paragraph 2 goes further to state that "this sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as its bed and subsoil". All coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea, the sea bed beneath their territorial sea, and the airspace above the territorial sea. The use of the term "sovereignty" connotes the bestowal of plenary powers upon the coastal State to regulate whatever happens in its territorial sea. in other words, no other State can exercise a concurrent sovereignty over its territorial sea unless and until the UNCLOS or other rules of international law so prescribe. The coastal State therefore has the right to exercise THE SAME powers in its territorial sea as it has over its land territory. Every Coastal State is entitled to 12 nautical miles worth of territorial sea which is equal to 22 kilometers; 14 miles.

RIGHTS OVER THE TERRITORIAL SEA
The rights of the coastal State over the Territorial Sea have been summed up as follows:

1. The exclusive rights over fisheries and the exploitation of the living and non living resources of the seabed and subsoil.
2. The right to exclude foreign vessels from trading along its coast (CABOTAGE: shall be discussed in further write ups)
3. The right to impose regulations concerning navigation, customs, fiscal, sanitary health and immigration.
4. The exclusive enjoyment of the airspace above the territorial sea
5. The duty of belligerents in time of war to respect the neutral States' territorial sea and refrain from belligerent activities therein
6. The certain powers of arrest over merchant ships exercising a right of innocent passage, and over persons onboard such ships.

Note however that Article 2 paragraph 3 of UNCLOS allows restriction upon a State's sovereignty when it provides that "The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised SUBJECT TO THIS CONVENTION and to other rules of international law".

Having said all this, the questions posed are:

1. How well have we exercised our rights over our territorial sea? Because if we have gone as far as making sure that our land environments are cleaned and sanitized once a month for example, how much have we extended those responsibilities over our territorial sea?
2. We have the military and police check points every where on the roads but to what extent have the territorial waters been properly protected and secured? Its not news today that organized crime have found routes of transport right under our noses and through the water ways.
3. How equipped and well informed are the Nigerian Navy as regards the security, protection and the regulation of the activities within our territorial sea?

No wonder we can't keep up with cabotage  (the transport of goods or passengers between two places in the same country by a transport operator from another country or an indigenous transport operator); because if we haven't even realized that the waters are our jurisdiction well enough to secure and regulate that environment for people to operate properly, there will be little to no hope on developing our waters. In this particular situation, creating awareness is KEY; this is first of all what I think every Nigerian should know. So in every Social Studies curriculum, in every school, in every geography class, inform every Nigerian that the waters are their home and their responsibility. When we say, "you must sweep your room every morning", lets follow it up and say "remember not to throw dirt into the water".

Load as many check points around our coasts are there are on our roads, create water disposing services and yes, there should be sanitation of our marine environments too every month. But the question again is, are there laws that make room for these actions to take place? Where is the body that should be enacting these laws? do they know their responsibilities?

Knowledge is Power...

CHAPTER ONE - (AN ANALYSIS ON THE PROTOCOL AGAINST THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURING OF AND TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS, THEIR PARTS AND COMPONENTS AND AMMUNITION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE MARITIME LEGAL REGIME IN NIGERIA)

CHAPTER ONE: A BACKGROUND TO THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURING AND TRAFFICKING OF FIREARMS

1.1 The Illicit Trafficking of Firearms Internationally

At the outset, it is expedient to understand what this project is centred around. Small arms include revolvers and self loading pistols, rifles, machine guns and the likes. Light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under barred and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-craft missiles, systems and mortars of calibres less than 100mm[1].

Weapons continue to be most commonly used in many of the violent civil and ethnic and religious conflicts of the post cold war era. All of the 34 major armed conflicts, documented during 1993 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), he claimed, are being fought with light weapons[2].

Unfortunately, a miniscule percent of container ships have cargo checks, therefore making the arms movement smooth. Faking documents (bills of lading, forged end-use certificates)[3], bribing officials and concealing arms as humanitarian aids are common practices. In 2002, traffickers acquired 5,000 AK-47s from Yugoslavian army stocks and moved them from Serbia to Liberia under the guise of a legal transaction with Nigeria. One of the planes used in this shipment came from Ukraine and made a refuelling stop in Libya while en route[4]. It is imperatively important to realize the magnitude of illicit activities that take place under the garb of globalization and work towards it comprehensively.

Globalization is not new and neither is the black market. Tom G. Palmer of the Cato Institute[5] defines Globalization as “the diminution or elimination of state-enforced restrictions on exchanges across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result[6].”

Christopher Louise, in his work[7]stated that the effect of globalization and societal disintegration have been greatly under-researched, advocates free market forces with minimized economic barriers and opens trade for world development. As a result, we have witnessed expansion of arms black market, minimized custom regulations and border control has dropped to an all time low.

In the contemporary times, terrorism has been regarded as a major threat to world security and the primary factor being catalyzed by the increase in illicit arms[8]. The illegal market for munitions encompasses top-of the-line tanks, radar systems that detect Stealth aircraft, and the makings of the deadliest weapons of mass destruction[9]. The global illegitimate business in small arms is valued approximately around US$ 1 billion and it’s important to realize that it’s the small arms that fuel crime and sustain armed conflicts world over[10].

In Colombia for example, the small arms proliferation has been the case for four decades and it continues to plague the countries such as Afghanistan and the States in the Middle East. It is equally responsible for facilitating terrorism and creating anarchy after civil wars in places like Burundi, Ghana, Yemen, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, and Pakistan[11]. The structure of the small arms black market today is a complex network stretching across the globe, siphoning the gains of globalization.

The journey of small arms begins from the legal circuit and eventually falls into illegal clutches[12]. There are multiple ways through which the legally originated arms get diverted to illegal spheres. Shipping through dangerous routes, stockpile mismanagement, loots, corruption among officials, warzone seizures are a few of them[13].

In June 2014, the representatives of all United Nations (UN) Member States came together at the Biennial Meeting of States in New York to consider the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action (POA) on the illicit trade in small arms. The program was initiated in July 2001 to eradicate the ever-growing illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and to help countries, combat this pernicious problem[14]. However, there are numerous areas that still remain extremely challenging to deal with.

Global Integration has enhanced human migration thereby helping arm dealers to fortify their present business connections and tap new ones by migrating to various regions, motivated by business expansion or reduced operational risks[15]. In case of arrests, arms dealers travel to countries where it is not possible to get extradited. It was reported that a man named Abu Salem, an underworld criminal from India, who besides having a lengthy criminal record, was involved in providing illegal arms for 1993 serial bomb blasts in India[16]; to escape arrest, left for Portugal. After 3 years of legal disputes, Indian authorities managed to extradite Abu Salem from Lisbon, Portugal. It was after this case that India and Portugal signed an extradition treaty in 2007[17].

Moreover, banking reforms and capital mobility have aided the black market to spread its trade internationally, utilizing every angle of the well linked financial market which gives rise to offshore markets and tax shelters[18]. The linkage of banks with the internet has posed a new challenge in combating illegitimate activities in the financial sector. E-banking has digitized money making it prone to criminality. Even though, it has numerous benefits for the world at large, it is misused for money laundering, credit card scams and check-kiting[19]. Adding to this, economic integration among regions blesses arm brokers with more opportunities to shelter their money, by investing in different stock exchanges. Numerous other illegal practices are a by-product of a deregulated financial sector, but money laundering is at the apex.

In addition, profound expansion of commercial airline and freight industry (making transport cheaper and easier) are instrumental in increased penetration of arm in conflict zones. Global merger of airline companies, supply chains, shipping firms make it tough to supervise unlawful practices in air and water[20].

Although, the growth of global communication in the past two decades has been unfathomable, it has enhanced the ability of arm dealers to communicate internationally through the web at a cheap rate. Arm dealers use ‘cloned’ cellular phones and unsecured broadband networks to surpass any chances of getting traced. Satellite phones are an option in remote areas where other means cannot be operated, providing an uninterrupted channel of contact and reach[21].

1.2 Trafficking of Firearms Illicitly in West Africa and Nigeria

West Africa is made up of 16 States and the regional States differ in territorial size, colonial history, economic strength, internal cohesion and external linkages[22]. They also differ in terms of population size, levels of development, and stages of State building and nature of resource endowments. They are confronted with different levels of security, governance and development challenges that have made them poor despite being greatly endowed with natural resources[23].

Although West African States gained political independence before any other region in colonial Africa, they all share a common feature of multiple layers of insecurity, associated with conflicts and crime at community and national levels; often across borders and with regional ramifications[24]. Threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, piracy, and arms trafficking have acquired worrisome transnational dimension and these crimes have emerged as formidable threats to human society and is now taking on a singular importance in terms of national, regional and international engagements[25].

The proliferation of SALW and their trafficking in Nigeria and Africa has posed a major threat to peace, security and development in the continent at large. Although they do not in themselves cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, the wide availability, accumulation and their illicit trafficking tend to escalate conflicts, undermine peace and agreements, intensify violence and impact on crime, impede economic and social development, and hinder the development of social stability, democracy and good governance[26].

SALW are increasingly undermining peace and security in West Africa. Out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide in 2004, it was estimated that about 100 million were in sub-Saharan Africa, with eight to ten million concentrated in West African sub-region[27].

An undeniable source of these illicit arms comes from the problem of black-racketeering which means, obtaining or extorting money illegally or carrying on illegal business activities, usually by organized crime[28]. A large portion of illicit firearms consist of leakages from members of the armed forces and the police both serving and retired. This includes the remnants from the Nigerian civil war and leakages from returnees of peace keeping operations[29].

The growing audacity of the Nigerian Boko Haram is one among many developments that have made West Africa a region of growing terror concern following an anti government revolt waged in July 2009 that attracted worldwide attention[30]. Boko Haram members have escalated attacks targeting mainly security and law enforcement agencies in addition to civilians, public infrastructure, community or religious leaders, places of worship, markets and media houses among others. Its tactics include use of improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings and suicide bombings. Their attacks are estimated to have cost more than 6000 lives since 2009, including deaths caused by the security forces. The 26^th August 2011 bombing of the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja that killed 23 people was devastating evidence that the group aims to internationalize its acts of terror[31].

The rise of Ansaru, an abridgement of a name that roughly translates as “Vanguards for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa” has claimed responsibility for various acts of terrorism in Nigeria such as the November 2012 armed attack on a detention facility in Abuja, the January 2013 ambushing of Mali-bound Nigerian soldiers at Kogi State, and the February 2013 kidnapping of the 7 foreign expatriates in Bauchi State[32].

Given ineffectual security systems, porous borders, and growing demand for arms by criminals and militants, cartels specializing in arms trafficking have devised methods for concealing and conveniently trafficking arms across borders in West Africa. The recent bank robbery attacks in Nigeria explain further how decadent the security systems have become in recent years. In 2011 alone, about 100 bank installations were attacked, and over 30 of these were attributed to Boko Haram[33].

These events are also related to oil theft (another area on its own) which is an escalating threat to the security of the marine environment off the coast of West Africa. There is growing speculation of a possible link between piracy in the gulf of Guinea and the financing of regional Islamist groups such as Al- Qaeda, Boko Haram and others. Some of the millions paid to the oil gangs are thought to have made their way to Islamist rebels linked to Al-Qaeda in Northern Nigeria[34].

The cargo supply chain which transports the products we eat, wear, drive and utilize daily is vulnerable to penetration and unauthorized access by criminal and terrorist elements. Cargo thieves, stowaways, pirates, drug smugglers, arms peddlers and terrorists constantly attempt to negate, circumvent or manipulate security measures designed to protect the cargo in the supply chain. The supply chain is made up of various “links” which may span the globe and pass through several countries.

Each entity that is a link in the cargo supply chain – manufacturers, warehouses, carriers, NVOCC[35], broker or importer – are a potential target for terrorists and arm smugglers[36]. Terrorist organizations could use the global trade network to transport or deliver arms to a target destination or country through cargo or a shipping container. Terrorists may want to penetrate or negate a company’s security controls for the purpose of placing a device inside the company’s cargo and in some cases, the terrorist cargo may actually be a “terrorist” utilizing the cargo, container or conveyance as a means of entering the country of interest. Terrorists may also intend to “taint” the cargo with a biological or chemical agent or poison for the purpose of causing harm to innocent persons handling the product or the ultimate consumer or to cause widespread panic[37].

Two prolific cases: one involving the tainting of Chilean grapes and the other being the targeting of Tylenol products which occurred in 2009 stand as examples. These cases cost the companies tens of millions of dollars and actually changed the way most medicines and many food products are packed and shipped. The ports, shipping lines and the entire cargo supply chain related to that product would likely be shut down indefinitely and many persons could loose their lives[38].

It is submitted that ports are generally dangerously exposed to vulnerabilities to warfare, criminal and terrorist attacks when security measures are not put in place. By its very nature as a complex, international, open transportation network, the port facility poses several additional challenges from a security standpoint. One of these is the risk factor associated with shipping. An estimated 90% of the world’s non bulk cargo travels in marine shipping containers. These standardized boxes have revolutionized the transport of goods by sea since their first appearance in the 1950’s and have given rise to a multitude of specialized road and rail carriers which comprises a fleet of over 2700 modular container vessels, a global network of over 430 highly automated port handling facilities.

According to a March 2007 report, in 2006, world maritime container traffic was estimated at 417, 000, 000 20 foot equivalent units or TEU’s (loaded and empty) which is 10% more than the 378 million TEU’s transported in 2005. The potential direct cost of a terrorist attack on shipping or maritime infrastructure varies tremendously according to the scope of the attack, its target and its location[39]. 

All these illegitimate operations abuse global trade facilitation arrangements, pose a threat to the security of the supply chain, and challenge legitimate trade. Daily seaport throughputs range from several hundreds to about 50,000 containers and require fast processing. A full overhaul by enforcement experts of just one commercial container, however, requires hours[40].

It is undisputed that the water ways/ seaports have provided havens for arms trafficking through ships and speed boats on high seas and the use of canoes in the creeks. The exchange of stolen crude oil for arms/ ammunition is a well known “trading activity” nurtured and ferociously protected by militants or sea pirates and their financiers/collaborators with the possible connivance of unscrupulous law enforcement agents in the Niger Delta region[41]. This is one major source of arms and ammunition that strengthens militants’ arms and ammunition holding not only in the Niger Delta but also in the South East and South Western parts of the country.

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[1] Reports from arms experts

[2] Christopher Loiuse ”The Social Impact of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation” found at http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/65

[3] http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-4273/

[4] Rachel Stohl “The tangled web of illicit arms trafficking”

[5] An American Think Tank Libertarian Institute established to have a focus on public advocacy, media exposure and societal influence

[6] Seen at http://www.slideshare.net/turjo987/globalization-44098225

[7] Christopher Louise “Relationship between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons”

[8] Debating Global Terrorism: Ethical Implications for Africa’s Development by Boaz Adhengo found at http://www.academia.edu/263543/DEBATING_GLOBAL_TERRORISM_Ethical_Implications_for_Africas_Development

[9] Moises Naim “The Five Wars of Globalization” found at http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/Course%20Readings/Naim.pdf

[10] Aditi Malhotra “ Globalisation and the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons” found at http://www.eurasiareview.com/15012011-globalisation-and-the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons/

[11] International Relations 10^th Edition by Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse found at http://www.academia.edu/8972746/International_Relations_2013-2014_Update_10th_Edition_by_Joshua_S._Goldstein_Jon_C._Pevehouse

[12] Op Cit

[13] Op Cit

[14] United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons found at http://www.un-arm.org/BMS5/

[15] Op Cit (Aditi Malhotra)

[16] Op Cit

[17]Indian Times Found at http://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/india-portugal-sign-extradition-treaty/443031

[18] Op Cit

[19] Op Cit

[20] Op Cit

[21] Op Cit

[22] Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa by Dr. Freedom C. Onuoha and Dr. Gerald E, Ezirim found at http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/6/24/2013624105836126734Terrorism%20and%20Transnational%20Organised%20Crime%20in%20West%20Africa.pdf

[23] Ibid

[24] Op Cit

[25] Op Cit

[26] Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa by Emmy Godwin Irobi Found at http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/irobi-ethnic

[27] The ECOWAS Moratorium on small arms and light weapons by Alhaji MS Bah

[28] Blacks Law Dictionary

[29] Federal Government of Nigeria, “Strategic Conflict Assessment: Consolidated and Zonal Reports”, (Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003), p 21.

[30] Op Cit

[31] Ibid

[32] ibid

[33] Class Theory of Terrorism: A study of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

[34] Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Trends, Concerns, and Propositions by F. Onuoha. Ph. D

[35] Non vessel operating common carrier e.g. freight forwarders

[36] US Customs and Border Protection found at http://www.cbp.gov/ 

[37] Vulnerabilities in the Cargo Supply Chain: Maritime Security by Clifford R. Bragdon

[38] Ibid

[39] Abuse of commercial containers for illicit purposes- Report by World Customs Organisation

[40] Par 3, Ibid

[41] How Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram smuggle arms into Nigeria by Sagir Musa Found At http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/how-al-qaeda-boko-haram-smuggle-arms-into-nigeria/