CHAPTER
ONE: A BACKGROUND TO THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURING AND TRAFFICKING OF FIREARMS
1.1
The Illicit Trafficking of Firearms Internationally
At the outset, it is expedient to understand
what this project is centred around. Small arms include revolvers and self loading
pistols, rifles, machine guns and the likes. Light weapons include heavy
machine guns, hand-held under barred and mounted grenade launchers, portable
anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-craft missiles, systems and mortars of
calibres less than 100mm[1].
Weapons
continue to be most commonly used in many of the violent civil and ethnic and religious
conflicts of the post cold war era. All of the 34 major armed conflicts,
documented during 1993 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), he claimed, are being fought with light weapons[2].
Unfortunately, a miniscule percent of
container ships have cargo checks, therefore making the arms movement smooth.
Faking documents (bills of lading, forged end-use certificates)[3], bribing officials and
concealing arms as humanitarian aids are common practices. In 2002, traffickers
acquired 5,000 AK-47s from Yugoslavian army stocks and moved them from Serbia
to Liberia under the guise of a legal transaction with Nigeria. One of the
planes used in this shipment came from Ukraine and made a refuelling stop in
Libya while en route[4]. It is imperatively important to realize the
magnitude of illicit activities that take place under the garb of globalization
and work towards it comprehensively.
Globalization is not new and neither is the
black market. Tom G. Palmer of the Cato Institute[5] defines Globalization as
“the diminution or elimination of state-enforced restrictions on exchanges
across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex global system of
production and exchange that has emerged as a result[6].”
Christopher
Louise, in his work[7]stated
that the effect of globalization and societal disintegration have been greatly
under-researched, advocates free market
forces with minimized economic barriers and opens trade for world development. As a
result, we have witnessed expansion of arms black market, minimized custom
regulations and border control has dropped to an all time low.
In the contemporary times, terrorism has been
regarded as a major threat to world security and the primary factor being
catalyzed by the increase in illicit arms[8]. The illegal market for
munitions encompasses top-of the-line tanks, radar systems that detect Stealth
aircraft, and the makings of the deadliest weapons of mass destruction[9]. The global illegitimate
business in small arms is valued approximately around US$ 1 billion and it’s
important to realize that it’s the small arms that fuel crime and sustain armed
conflicts world over[10].
In Colombia for example, the small arms
proliferation has been the case for four decades and it continues to plague the
countries such as Afghanistan and the States in the Middle East. It is equally
responsible for facilitating terrorism and creating anarchy after civil wars in
places like Burundi, Ghana, Yemen, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, and Pakistan[11]. The structure of the
small arms black market today is a complex network stretching across the globe,
siphoning the gains of globalization.
The journey of small arms begins from the
legal circuit and eventually falls into illegal clutches[12]. There are multiple ways
through which the legally originated arms get diverted to illegal spheres.
Shipping through dangerous routes, stockpile mismanagement, loots, corruption
among officials, warzone seizures are a few of them[13].
In June 2014, the representatives of all
United Nations (UN) Member States came together at the Biennial Meeting of
States in New York to consider the implementation of the 2001 Programme of
Action (POA) on the illicit trade in small arms. The program was initiated in
July 2001 to eradicate the ever-growing illicit trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW) and to help countries, combat this pernicious problem[14]. However, there are
numerous areas that still remain extremely challenging to deal with.
Global Integration has enhanced human migration
thereby helping arm dealers to fortify their present business connections and
tap new ones by migrating to various regions, motivated by business expansion
or reduced operational risks[15]. In case of arrests, arms
dealers travel to countries where it is not possible to get extradited. It was
reported that a man named Abu Salem, an underworld criminal from India, who
besides having a lengthy criminal record, was involved in providing illegal
arms for 1993 serial bomb blasts in India[16]; to escape arrest, left
for Portugal. After 3 years of legal disputes, Indian authorities managed to
extradite Abu Salem from Lisbon, Portugal. It was after this case that India
and Portugal signed an extradition treaty in 2007[17].
Moreover, banking reforms and capital mobility
have aided the black market to spread its trade internationally, utilizing
every angle of the well linked financial market which gives rise to offshore
markets and tax shelters[18]. The linkage of banks
with the internet has posed a new challenge in combating illegitimate
activities in the financial sector. E-banking has digitized money making it
prone to criminality. Even though, it has numerous benefits for the world at
large, it is misused for money laundering, credit card scams and check-kiting[19]. Adding to this, economic
integration among regions blesses arm brokers with more opportunities to
shelter their money, by investing in different stock exchanges. Numerous other
illegal practices are a by-product of a deregulated financial sector, but money
laundering is at the apex.
In addition, profound expansion of commercial
airline and freight industry (making transport cheaper and easier) are
instrumental in increased penetration of arm in conflict zones. Global merger
of airline companies, supply chains, shipping firms make it tough to supervise
unlawful practices in air and water[20].
Although, the growth of global communication
in the past two decades has been unfathomable, it has enhanced the ability of
arm dealers to communicate internationally through the web at a cheap rate. Arm
dealers use ‘cloned’ cellular phones and unsecured broadband networks to
surpass any chances of getting traced. Satellite phones are an option in remote
areas where other means cannot be operated, providing an uninterrupted channel
of contact and reach[21].
1.2
Trafficking of Firearms Illicitly in West Africa and Nigeria
West Africa is made up of 16 States and the
regional States differ in territorial size, colonial history, economic
strength, internal cohesion and external linkages[22]. They also differ in
terms of population size, levels of development, and stages of State building
and nature of resource endowments. They are confronted with different levels of
security, governance and development challenges that have made them poor
despite being greatly endowed with natural resources[23].
Although West African States gained political
independence before any other region in colonial Africa, they all share a common
feature of multiple layers of insecurity, associated with conflicts and crime at
community and national levels; often across borders and with regional
ramifications[24].
Threats like terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, piracy, and
arms trafficking have acquired worrisome transnational dimension and these
crimes have emerged as formidable threats to human society and is now taking on
a singular importance in terms of national, regional and international
engagements[25].
The proliferation of SALW
and their trafficking in Nigeria and Africa has posed a major threat to peace,
security and development in the continent at large. Although they do not in
themselves cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used,
the wide availability, accumulation and their illicit trafficking tend to
escalate conflicts, undermine peace and agreements, intensify violence and
impact on crime, impede economic and social development, and hinder the
development of social stability, democracy and good governance[26].
SALW are increasingly undermining peace and
security in West Africa. Out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in
circulation worldwide in 2004, it was estimated that about 100 million were in
sub-Saharan Africa, with eight to ten million concentrated in West African
sub-region[27].
An undeniable source of these illicit arms
comes from the problem of black-racketeering which means, obtaining or extorting money illegally or carrying
on illegal business activities, usually by organized crime[28]. A large portion of
illicit firearms consist of leakages from members of the armed forces and the
police both serving and retired. This includes the remnants from the Nigerian
civil war and leakages from returnees of peace keeping operations[29].
The growing audacity of the Nigerian Boko
Haram is one among many developments that have made West Africa a region of
growing terror concern following an anti government revolt waged in July 2009
that attracted worldwide attention[30]. Boko Haram members have
escalated attacks targeting mainly security and law enforcement agencies in
addition to civilians, public infrastructure, community or religious leaders,
places of worship, markets and media houses among others. Its tactics include
use of improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations, drive-by
shootings and suicide bombings. Their attacks are estimated to have cost more
than 6000 lives since 2009, including deaths caused by the security forces. The
26th August 2011 bombing of the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja
that killed 23 people was devastating evidence that the group aims to
internationalize its acts of terror[31].
The rise of Ansaru, an abridgement of a name
that roughly translates as “Vanguards for the protection of Muslims in Black
Africa” has claimed responsibility for various acts of terrorism in Nigeria
such as the November 2012 armed attack on a detention facility in Abuja, the
January 2013 ambushing of Mali-bound Nigerian soldiers at Kogi State, and the
February 2013 kidnapping of the 7 foreign expatriates in Bauchi State[32].
Given ineffectual security systems, porous
borders, and growing demand for arms by criminals and militants, cartels specializing
in arms trafficking have devised methods for concealing and conveniently
trafficking arms across borders in West Africa. The recent bank robbery attacks
in Nigeria explain further how decadent the security systems have become in
recent years. In 2011 alone, about 100 bank installations were attacked, and
over 30 of these were attributed to Boko Haram[33].
These events are also related to oil theft (another
area on its own) which is an escalating threat to the security of the marine environment
off the coast of West Africa. There is growing speculation of a possible link
between piracy in the gulf of Guinea and the financing of regional Islamist
groups such as Al- Qaeda, Boko Haram and others. Some of the millions paid to
the oil gangs are thought to have made their way to Islamist rebels linked to
Al-Qaeda in Northern Nigeria[34].
The cargo supply chain
which transports the products we eat, wear, drive and utilize daily is
vulnerable to penetration and unauthorized access by criminal and terrorist elements.
Cargo thieves, stowaways, pirates, drug smugglers, arms peddlers and terrorists
constantly attempt to negate, circumvent or manipulate security measures
designed to protect the cargo in the supply chain. The supply chain is made up
of various “links” which may span the globe and pass through several countries.
Each entity that is a
link in the cargo supply chain – manufacturers, warehouses, carriers, NVOCC[35],
broker or importer – are a potential target for terrorists and arm smugglers[36].
Terrorist organizations could use the global trade network to transport or
deliver arms to a target destination or country through cargo or a shipping
container. Terrorists may want to penetrate or negate a company’s security
controls for the purpose of placing a device inside the company’s cargo and in
some cases, the terrorist cargo may actually be a “terrorist” utilizing the
cargo, container or conveyance as a means of entering the country of interest.
Terrorists may also intend to “taint” the cargo with a biological or chemical
agent or poison for the purpose of causing harm to innocent persons handling
the product or the ultimate consumer or to cause widespread panic[37].
Two prolific cases:
one involving the tainting of Chilean grapes and the other being the targeting
of Tylenol products which occurred in 2009 stand as examples. These cases cost
the companies tens of millions of dollars and actually changed the way most
medicines and many food products are packed and shipped. The ports, shipping
lines and the entire cargo supply chain related to that product would likely be
shut down indefinitely and many persons could loose their lives[38].
It is submitted that
ports are generally dangerously exposed to vulnerabilities to warfare, criminal
and terrorist attacks when security measures are not put in place. By its very
nature as a complex, international, open transportation network, the port
facility poses several additional challenges from a security standpoint. One of
these is the risk factor associated with shipping. An estimated 90% of the
world’s non bulk cargo travels in marine shipping containers. These
standardized boxes have revolutionized the transport of goods by sea since
their first appearance in the 1950’s and have given rise to a multitude of specialized
road and rail carriers which comprises a fleet of over 2700 modular container
vessels, a global network of over 430 highly automated port handling
facilities.
According to a March
2007 report, in 2006, world maritime container traffic was estimated at 417,
000, 000 20 foot equivalent units or TEU’s (loaded and empty) which is 10% more
than the 378 million TEU’s transported in 2005. The potential direct cost of a
terrorist attack on shipping or maritime infrastructure varies tremendously
according to the scope of the attack, its target and its location[39].
All these illegitimate
operations abuse global trade facilitation arrangements, pose a threat to the
security of the supply chain, and challenge legitimate trade. Daily seaport
throughputs range from several hundreds to about 50,000 containers and require
fast processing. A full overhaul by enforcement experts of just one commercial
container, however, requires hours[40].
It is
undisputed that the water ways/ seaports have provided havens for arms
trafficking through ships and speed boats on high seas and the use of canoes in
the creeks. The exchange of stolen crude oil for arms/ ammunition is a well
known “trading activity” nurtured and ferociously protected by militants or sea
pirates and their financiers/collaborators with the possible connivance of
unscrupulous law enforcement agents in the Niger Delta region[41].
This is one major source of arms and ammunition that strengthens militants’
arms and ammunition holding not only in the Niger Delta but also in the South
East and South Western parts of the country.
[2] Christopher Loiuse ”The Social Impact of Light Weapons
Availability and Proliferation” found at http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/65
[3] http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-4273/
[5] An American Think Tank Libertarian Institute established to have a focus on public
advocacy, media exposure and societal influence
[7] Christopher Louise “Relationship between
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons”
[8] Debating Global Terrorism: Ethical Implications for
Africa’s Development by Boaz Adhengo found at http://www.academia.edu/263543/DEBATING_GLOBAL_TERRORISM_Ethical_Implications_for_Africas_Development
[9] Moises Naim “The Five Wars of Globalization” found at http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/Course%20Readings/Naim.pdf
[10] Aditi Malhotra “ Globalisation and the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and
Light Weapons” found at http://www.eurasiareview.com/15012011-globalisation-and-the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons/
[11] International Relations 10th Edition by
Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse found at http://www.academia.edu/8972746/International_Relations_2013-2014_Update_10th_Edition_by_Joshua_S._Goldstein_Jon_C._Pevehouse
[14] United Nations Programme of Action on Small
Arms and Light Weapons found at http://www.un-arm.org/BMS5/
[22] Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in West
Africa by Dr. Freedom C. Onuoha and Dr. Gerald E, Ezirim found at http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2013/6/24/2013624105836126734Terrorism%20and%20Transnational%20Organised%20Crime%20in%20West%20Africa.pdf
[26] Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A comparative
Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa by Emmy Godwin Irobi Found at http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/irobi-ethnic
[29] Federal Government of Nigeria,
“Strategic Conflict Assessment: Consolidated and Zonal Reports”, (Abuja:
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003), p 21.
[34] Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea:
Trends, Concerns, and Propositions by F. Onuoha. Ph. D
[41] How Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram smuggle arms into Nigeria
by Sagir Musa Found At http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/how-al-qaeda-boko-haram-smuggle-arms-into-nigeria/
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